• Dying To Win Robert Pape Pdf To Excellent

Dying to win author by Robert Pape. Other Format: PDF EPUB MOBI TXT CHM WORD PPT. America's Strategic Choices: Revised Edition (An International Security Reader) Have not added any book description!

Author by: Robert PapeLanguange: enPublisher by: Random HouseFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 44Total Download: 811File Size: 46,9 MbDescription: Suicide terrorism is rising around the world, but there is great confusion as to why. In this paradigm-shifting analysis, University of Chicago political scientist Robert Pape has collected groundbreaking evidence to explain the strategic, social, and individual factors responsible for this growing threat. One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject, Professor Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. With striking clarity and precision, Professor Pape uses this unprecedented research to debunk widely held misconceptions about the nature of suicide terrorism and provide a new lens that makes sense of the threat we face. FACT: Suicide terrorism is not primarily a product of Islamic fundamentalism.

FACT: The world’s leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka–a secular, Marxist-Leninist group drawn from Hindu families. FACT: Ninety-five percent of suicide terrorist attacks occur as part of coherent campaigns organized by large militant organizations with significant public support. FACT: Every suicide terrorist campaign has had a clear goal that is secular and political: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. FACT: Al-Qaeda fits the above pattern. Although Saudi Arabia is not under American military occupation per se, one major objective of al-Qaeda is the expulsion of U.S. Troops from the Persian Gulf region, and as a result there have been repeated attacks by terrorists loyal to Osama bin Laden against American troops in Saudi Arabia and the region as a whole.

FACT: Despite their rhetoric, democracies–including the United States–have routinely made concessions to suicide terrorists. Suicide terrorism is on the rise because terrorists have learned that it’s effective. In this wide-ranging analysis, Professor Pape offers the essential tools to forecast when some groups are likely to resort to suicide terrorism and when they are not.

He also provides the first comprehensive demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers. With data from more than 460 such attackers–including the names of 333–we now know that these individuals are not mainly poor, desperate criminals or uneducated religious fanatics but are often well-educated, middle-class political activists. More than simply advancing new theory and facts, these pages also answer key questions about the war on terror:. Are we safer now than we were before September 11?. Was the invasion of Iraq a good counterterrorist move?. Is al-Qaeda stronger now than it was before September 11?

Professor Pape answers these questions with analysis grounded in fact, not politics, and recommends concrete ways for today’s states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks. Military options may disrupt terrorist operations in the short term, but a lasting solution to suicide terrorism will require a comprehensive, long-term approach–one that abandons visions of empire and relies on a combined strategy of vigorous homeland security, nation building in troubled states, and greater energy independence. For both policy makers and the general public, Dying to Win transcends speculation with systematic scholarship, making it one of the most important political studies of recent time.

From the Hardcover edition. Author by: Barrie HoulihanLanguange: enPublisher by: Council of EuropeFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 17Total Download: 190File Size: 50,5 MbDescription: Drug abuse in sport has now become an acute international problem, which undermines the integrity of sport and is a real danger to the health of thousands of athletes. The second edition of this publication has been updated to take account of new forms of drug abuse in the sports world, as well as developments in genetic engineering and gene therapy. It also contains a list of useful internet sources. A key finding is that the control of doping, including the harmonisation of both practice and policy among the major world sports bodies, requires a re-evaluation of the direction of future anti-doping policy, particularly in the light of the recent establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency. Author by: BusinessNews PublishingLanguange: enPublisher by: PrimentoFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 48Total Download: 756File Size: 52,6 MbDescription: The must-read summary of Robert A.

Pape's book: 'Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism'. This complete summary of 'Dying to Win' by Robert A.

Pape, a renowned political scientist, provides a history of suicide terrorism and a new perspective on what we already know about this topic. In his book, the author presents his findings based on documented fact and calls into question the reasons behind these attacks. Added-value of this summary:. Save time. Understand terrorist attacks throughout history.

Expand your knowledge of politics and history To learn more, read 'Dying to Win' and find out more about the history of suicide terrorism and the reasons behind it. Author by: Eve CraigLanguange: enPublisher by: Cozy Mystery PressFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 89Total Download: 190File Size: 51,7 MbDescription: This book is a clean Cozy Mystery short story that does not contain foul language, sexual situations, witches, or paranormal events. Holly Bridges had always dreamed of having her own stable. While out for a drive in the country, she found a farm with a large indoor arena and several outdoor arenas. Even though it looked like it hadn't been used in years, it was the perfect location for holding equestrian shows and stabling horses. Shortly after opening, Holly managed to acquire a prominent local's horse as her first boarder. With the new tenant it looked like Happy Hollow Stable's first equestrian show could be a huge draw for the locals.

Well, that is until a dead body showed up in a nearby field. Will the show go on or will Holly have to give up her lifelong dream? Author by: Patricia H.

RushfordLanguange: enPublisher by: Blackstone PublishingFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 13Total Download: 510File Size: 46,7 MbDescription: Jennie McGrady is quickly gaining a reputation as an amateur sleuth, and it isn’t going unnoticed by the local media. But the glamour of publicity is getting old, and Jennie would love to disappear into the crowd—especially when a plea from Courtney Evans leaves her out in the cold. Courtney is the typical wild sixteen-year-old: weird hair, strange friends, and an attitude to boot. But underneath the hype Jennie finds a compassionate, hurting friend who is running scared. When Courtney disappears, the police suggest she ran away, but Jennie’s instincts tell her this mystery has the sickly smell of drugs and money surrounding it. Gavin Winslow is determined to break into the world of journalism, and he thinks Jennie is his ticket in.

A lead story on Portland’s very own Nancy Drew would get him the career attention he needs, but is his interest in Jennie more than professional? Author by: Teri CapshawLanguange: enPublisher by:Format Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 40Total Download: 229File Size: 45,8 MbDescription: Is fear of failing your child academically holding your family hostage? The truth is even in some parts of the world where students ace international tests families still struggle. Teri reveals what makes kids from successful homeschool families excel. Discover seven steps you can take to inspire and ignite a love of learning in your child. Author by: Costica BradatanLanguange: enPublisher by: Bloomsbury PublishingFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 19Total Download: 280File Size: 42,8 MbDescription: What do Socrates, Hypatia, Giordano Bruno, Thomas More, and Jan Patocka have in common?

First, they were all faced one day with the most difficult of choices: stay faithful to your ideas and die or renounce them and stay alive. Second, they all chose to die. Their spectacular deaths have become not only an integral part of their biographies, but are also inseparable from their work. A 'death for ideas' is a piece of philosophical work in its own right; Socrates may have never written a line, but his death is one of the greatest philosophical best-sellers of all time. Dying for Ideas explores the limit-situation in which philosophers find themselves when the only means of persuasion they can use is their own dying bodies and the public spectacle of their death.

The book tells the story of the philosopher's encounter with death as seen from several angles: the tradition of philosophy as an art of living; the body as the site of self-transcending; death as a classical philosophical topic; taming death and self-fashioning; finally, the philosophers' scapegoating and their live performance of a martyr's death, followed by apotheosis and disappearance into myth. While rooted in the history of philosophy, Dying for Ideas is an exercise in breaking disciplinary boundaries.

This is a book about Socrates and Heidegger, but also about Gandhi's 'fasting unto death' and self-immolation; about Girard and Passolini, and self-fashioning and the art of the essay. Author by: Amir HussainLanguange: enPublisher by: Oxford University PressFormat Available: PDF, ePub, MobiTotal Read: 22Total Download: 723File Size: 50,9 MbDescription: This ebook is a selective guide designed to help scholars and students of Islamic studies find reliable sources of information by directing them to the best available scholarly materials in whatever form or format they appear from books, chapters, and journal articles to online archives, electronic data sets, and blogs.

Written by a leading international authority on the subject, the ebook provides bibliographic information supported by direct recommendations about which sources to consult and editorial commentary to make it clear how the cited sources are interrelated related. A reader will discover, for instance, the most reliable introductions and overviews to the topic, and the most important publications on various areas of scholarly interest within this topic. In Islamic studies, as in other disciplines, researchers at all levels are drowning in potentially useful scholarly information, and this guide has been created as a tool for cutting through that material to find the exact source you need. This ebook is a static version of an article from Oxford Bibliographies Online: Islamic Studies, a dynamic, continuously updated, online resource designed to provide authoritative guidance through scholarship and other materials relevant to the study of the Islamic religion and Muslim cultures.

Oxford Bibliographies Online covers most subject disciplines within the social science and humanities, for more information visit www.aboutobo.com.

Terrorism deaths worldwide, 1970-2015.Terrorist activity worldwide has grown dramatically since 2012, at least according to terrorism deaths recorded in the summarized in Figure 1.In the following, we (1) note that terrorism is minuscule as a cause of death nearly everywhere, (2) review the literature on the long-term impact of alternative responses to terrorism and conflict more generally, (3) discuss the role of the media in shaping public reactions to terrorism (and virtually any other public policy issue), and (4) summarize implications of the above for personal action and public policy. Terrorism is minuscule as a cause of death Before discussing possible contributors to the recent spike in terrorism deaths, we first note that terrorism is essentially minuscule as a cause of death, except for a small number of countries with active armed conflicts: Even in the worst year on record, 2014, terrorism deaths were less than 0.08 percent (one twelfth of one percent or 800 per million) of all deaths worldwide that year. More generally, terrorism has been responsible for the deaths of 0.02 percent (one fiftieth of one percent or 200 per million) of all the people who have died since the first entry in the Global Terrorism Database in 1970.Certainly, deaths are not the only problem from terrorism: Terrorist attacks also injure people, and destroy property. Terrorism deaths in France. The spike in 2015 is over 6 times the previous maximum since 1970 and is indicated by a number off the scale.Figure 2 plots terrorism deaths in through 2015.

The number for 2015 is labeled, not plotted, because it is over 6 times the second largest recorded number of terrorism deaths in France since the first entry in the (GTD) in 1970, and plotting it would make it difficult to see the earlier variability. GTD data for 2016 are not yet available. However, the Wikipedia reports 89 deaths for that year. That’s just over half the number for 2015 and over three times the previous maximum. These relatively high numbers have made security a key issue in the French presidential campaign in progress as this is being written.These numbers are, nevertheless, tiny as a cause of death. The 161 terrorism deaths in France in 2015 is roughly 0.03 percent (one thirtieth of a percent or 300 per million) of all French deaths that year. Terrorism deaths in the United States.

The spike in 2001 is labeled, not plotted, because it is almost 20 times the death toll from the second largest terrorist attack in US history, the, which killed 168 people in 1995.The two biggest terrorist attacks on soil were the that took roughly 3,000 lives, and the that killed 168 people in 1995. For the US, records show no recent spike comparable to that for the world and France in Figures 1 and 2; see Figure 3. The most recent years suggest a modest upward trend - possibly a return to the environment of the early 1970s, but nothing like 2001 nor the recent worldwide or French numbers. The GTD records 1,397 US citizens killed in terrorist incidents between 1970 and 2000, and 943 between 2002 and 2015, for an average of 116 per year over these 46 years; without 2001, it averages only 52 per year. For 2001 through 2016, an average of 257 US citizens were killed per year.

Averaged over the 46 years in the Global Terrorism Database, terrorism has taken the lives of 0.005 percent (one half of one hundredth of one percent or 50 per million) of all Americans who died during that period.To put these numbers into perspective, we provide two comparisons:. Thus, more people were killed in the average month in 2001 than in the worst terrorist incident ever recorded. Between 2001 and 2015, 569,229 people died on US highways and 3,939 died from terrorist attacks - a ratio of 145 to 1. Roughly (This doesn't count breast cancer among women, who are roughly 100 times as likely to get it as men.) That’s roughly 0.03 percent (one thirtieth of a percent or 300 per million) of all male deaths in the US. Thus, breast cancer has taken the lives of roughly six times as many men in the US as terrorism since the first entry in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) in 1970. This rate, 0.03 percent, is the same rate as the worst year on record for France, and roughly a third of the recent worldwide spike in Figure 1.

Between 1999 and 2003, a total of 1,676 Americans were reported to have drowned in a bathtub, hot tub or spa, averaging 335 a year.In other words, America’s highways and tubs are greater risks than terrorism, and breast cancer is a greater risk even for males, except in countries with active armed hostilities like Iraq. Beyond this, as noted above, you are several times more likely to die from a fire, accidental poisoning, drowning or a fall.This is not to trivialize terrorist deaths, but only to say that we should not spend more money on protection against terrorism than the threat deserves - and we should avoid actions that could make it worse, as suggested by the evidence summarized here.1.2. Countries with the most terrorism deaths 2014-2015. Terrorism deaths by country, 2014-2015, per the Global Terrorism Database.Figure 4 summarizes the total number of terrorism deaths by country in 2014 and 2015. France and the US are buried in the thirteenth “other” category in this plot. Terrorism is not a substantive problem for France or the US or anywhere else except for the relatively small number of countries with active armed hostilities, identified in Figure 4.Not one of these countries had a comparable terrorism problem prior to the announcement of the US-led “”.

This is clear from plots similar to Figures 1-3 for each of these dozen countries individually (available in Appendix 1). Pakistan, Egypt, and Sudan had terrorism problems prior to 2001 but nothing comparable to what they’ve experienced since the US declared a War on Terror.This claim is supported by more than just the relatively tiny number of deaths and injuries. It is also supported by research on the long-term impact of alternative approaches to conflict. This is called here ' and summarized in the next section.2. Research on the long-term impact of alternative approaches to conflict. When people are killed and property destroyed, the apparent perpetrators often make enemies. as commander of US Central Command understood that “you can't kill your way out of an insurgency, You have to find other kinds of ammunition, and it's not always a bullet,' according to one of his closest colleagues., who held several command positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, wrote, 'we found that nearly every first-time jihadist claimed that the torture at Abu Ghraib had first jolted him into action.'

He also said that, 'mistreating detainees would discredit us. The pictures from Abu Ghraib represented a setback for America's efforts in Iraq. Simultaneously undermining US domestic confidence in the way in which America was operating, and creating or reinforcing negative perceptions worldwide of American values, it fueled violence'.The research reviewed here suggests that the world would be safer, more prosperous, and more democratic if the West treated terrorism as a law enforcement issue, strengthening international law, while dramatically reducing its reliance on military force. We need more research to better understand what drives people off the sidelines to support one side or the other in conflict and what motivates them to increase or decrease their level of support and to defect.2.1. How terrorist groups end. How terrorist groups end ( n = 268): The most common ending for a terrorist group is to convert to nonviolence via negotiations (43 percent), with most of the rest terminated by law enforcement (40 percent). Groups that were ended by military force constituted only 7 percent.In 2008 two researchers with the, and, discussed all the terrorist groups they could find that were active between 1968 and 2006: they found 648.

Of those, 136 splintered, 244 were still active, leaving 268 that had ended. Of the ones that ended, 83 percent succumbed to rule of law, including 43 percent converting to non-violent political actors and 40 percent taken out by law enforcement.

Only 20 groups, 7 percent, were defeated by military action; 10 percent won.When Jones and Libicki focused only on terrorist groups that became large enough to be called an “insurgency,” like the, the percentages changed: 18 of 38 (47 percent) were ended by negotiations. 10 (26 percent) ended in victory for the insurgents. 8 (21 percent) succumbed to military force.

2 (5 percent) were suppressed by law enforcement.Thus, when a terrorist group converted to an insurgency, the use of military force increased. Percent (.)violentnonviolentviolentnonviolentOutcomesuccess555725%54%partial success282613%25%failure1342362%22%total217106100%100% (.)(.) Percent within conflicts of the same primary nature. Thus, the 'violent' column percents add to 100. The nonviolent total differs from 100 only because of round-off.However, the benefits of nonviolence extend beyond the end of a conflict.

Chenoweth and Stephan merged their data with the, which 'is a widely used data series summarizing annual information on the level of democracy for all independent states with greater than 500,000 total population and covers the years 1800–2013. For each year and country, a 'Polity Score' is determined, which ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to, -5 to 5 corresponding to, and 6 to 10 to.'

Polity Score ranges from -10 to +10minimum valuemaximum value-10-6-55610Table 3 shows the average increase in democratization from one year before the start of a conflict to one, five, and ten years after. The results suggest that win or lose, nonviolence tends on average to be followed by an increase in the Polity IV rating while violence has relatively little impact on democratization. As noted above, nonviolence builds democracy, while violence perpetuates tyranny, on average, in the long run.Table 3. Average increase in Polity score from one year before to 1, 5 and 10 years after a conflict. Democratization 5 years after (vertical scale) vs. 1 year before (horizontal scale) twentieth century revolutionsThis plot includes six panels grouped by the primary nature (violent or nonviolent) of the conflict and the outcome (failure, partial success, success). Points on the dotted diagonal line in each panel indicate conflicts that were accompanied by zero change in their Polity scores for the indicated time frame.The solid lines in each panel are based on the best fit of several models considered.

This expresses the democracy score after the conflict as linearly dependent on the democracy score before plus interactions between outcome and both the democracy score before and the primary nature of the conflict.These plots show more detail behind the simple summary of Table 3: Successful nonviolent revolutions have on average had a substantial impact in increasing the level of democracy among autocracies but no impact among the best democracies. By contrast, the worst long term outcomes tend to be from successful violent revolutions. This is worth repeating:. Successful violent revolutions provide the worst prospects for democracy in most cases.This can be explained by observing that successful violence brings to power people who know how to use violence but are not as good at solving problems without violence. (The comparable analyses of democratization 1 and 10 years after the end of the conflict are essentially the same; those plots are in Appendix 2.)In sum, the overall image supports the claim made above: Win or lose, nonviolence builds democracy, while violence perpetuates tyranny, on average, in the long run.This is consistent with the findings of Jones and Libicki (2008) mentioned above, that better outcomes for democracy are achieved when governmental officials support rule of law and negotiations. More on this comes from research on why people obey the law, when they do.2.3.

Why people obey the law People tend to obey the law, when they do, when. Concluded that people of different ethnicities in the US have essentially the same concept of justice as majority whites but different experiences. This was based on a survey of African-Americans, Hispanics, and whites. Daniel Kahneman, research psychologist who won the 2002 for seminal research that showed that the standard economic models of a do not correspond with how humans actually think.Leaders and experts in many fields make worse predictions than simple rules of thumb developed by intelligent lay people, according to research psychologist. After studying the quality of expert opinion, Kahneman concluded that “true skill” requires two things:. An environment that is sufficiently regular to be predictable.

Dying To Win Robert Pape Pdf To Excellent

Opportunities to learn through prolonged practice.Some fields have these attributes; others do not.One of Kahneman's examples involves financial markets. Two things happen every trading day.

First, the financial markets either go up or down. Second, the nightly news features a pundit, who tells us why. The value of this commentary for predicting the future is zero. That's because this situation lacks sufficient regularity to support learning (Kahneman's first condition), as enough people with enough money are already in the market trying to predict it. The daily movements in prices reflect what's left and is essentially random.

However, claims of random variability will not attract an audience, but “experts” spouting nonsense will - as long as the audience doesn't know it's nonsense.Kahneman's two conditions rarely apply in politics. With media primarily focused on selling behavior change in their audience to funders (as noted in the discussion of the media below), politicians are too often promoted while people trying to facilitate understanding and deescalation over escalation in conflict may be vilified as naive appeasers.

's was used to justify torture and preventive war in the absence of substantive evidence to support it, with no apparent consideration of how such policies might manufacture support for the opposition.In a survey of empirical research on 'Interventions / Uses of force short of war,' Prins wrote, 'hawkish leaders frequently rise to power by exploiting fears of conflict escalation. The increasingly coercive polices designed to check a rival only exacerbate security concerns and deepen national perceptions of enmity.'

From at least some perspectives, US Vice President Dick Cheney and Israeli Prime Minister might fit this description by Prins.Similar questions have been raised about how military officers are promoted. During active hostilities, the ability to win military battles can weigh heavily in promotion criteria. However, the impact of those battles on the long term outcome of the conflict is rarely a consideration. It is difficult if not impossible for military and political leaders to acquire Kahneman’s “true skill,” because the long-term impact of their actions is difficult to discern in the short term and not rewarded by the current political climate.This short-term information deficit increases the need to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on what motivates one’s opposition. Moreover, the system for collecting and disseminating such information should be independent of the policy makers, because the temptation to suppress bad news is generally too great to resist. Virtually every party to conflict thinks they know more than they do about what motivates their opposition.This follows from the overconfidence that virtually everyone has in the value of current knowledge, discussed below.

Independent collection and dissemination of information on the motivations of people in conflict may help open paths to dialog and resolution, thereby reducing the duration and lethality of conflict.The quotes from Generals Petraeus and McChrystal in the introduction to this section on “effective defense” suggest that some leaders may understand this, at least at some level. However, these kinds of observations generally get too little coverage in the mainstream media, perhaps because they do not support the responses apparently favored by major advertisers like the major oil companies. (See also the discussion of media ownership, funding and profitability, below.)2.11. US foreign interventions in opposition to democracy. Are the US and the rest of the world better off as a result of its numerous interventions in foreign countries in opposition to democracy?Consider the military coups that destroyed democracy in Iran 1953, Guatemala 1954, Brazil 1964, and Chile 1973: In all these cases there is solid documentation of US involvement.

Beyond this, there are substantial claims that the US clandestinely supported the; at minimum, the, which had been held up in the Syrian parliament, was approved roughly 6 weeks after the coup.Consider also the 1952 Cuban elections, which were canceled by a military coup on March 10 organized. Batista had been supported by the US as de facto head of state of Cuba since 1933, but polls showed him losing badly. The US officially deplored the coup but recognized the new Batista government on March 27., a 25-year old attorney, had been running for a seat in the Cuban House of Representatives in that election. If democracy had not been overthrown in Cuba, Fidel likely would have had a career as a politician and attorney in a democratic Cuba.Similarly, had been working in Guatemala at the time of the. That coup turned him into a revolutionary. Without that coup, Guevara would likely have had a successful career improving public health and democracy in Latin America.Also, former President said, 'I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh'. History records that Eisenhower used that information to get appointed as the head of the government in the southern region of Vietnam following the, and Diem effectively canceled the reunification elections scheduled for 1956 as part of those agreements.

In spite of substantial discussion in the US media of the need to win the, the US in essence turned a blind eye to the governmental corruption that had driven people to support Ho Chi Minh and ignored the massive “collateral damage” that drove people to continue to support the insurgents.An October 14, 2014, story quoted then-President Obama as saying, “Very early in the discussions about helping Syrian rebels, I actually asked the C.I.A. To analyze examples of America financing and supplying arms to an insurgency in a country that actually worked out well. And they couldn’t come up with much.”. If the overall record of US foreign interventions is positive, the successes are well hidden.2.12. Bush: 'Why do they hate us?'

On 2001-09-20, nine days after the, US President asked, 'Why do they hate us?' He gave his own answer to this rhetorical question: 'They hate our democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms: our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.' We need serious, unclassified research into why people choose one side or the other in this and other conflicts, why some people remain on the sidelines, and why some change their affiliations over time, increasing or decreasing their level of support, deserting or defecting. Such research might identify a large portion of US enemies motivated a desire for the freedoms the US claims to hold so dear and a hatred of US support for governments that deny them those freedoms.And in addition to researching such questions, we need a media system that will disseminate the results, free from the conflicts of interest that encumber the mainstream media virtually everywhere today, as suggested elsewhere in this essay.In fact, when the, they didn't know the authors of the. This was implicit in the report eight months later that, then, said they still didn't know who did it.

They suspected that the plot had been hatched in Afghanistan but implemented in Germany, the United Arab Emirates, and, of course, the United States.That information was clearly available to the Bush administration before they invaded Afghanistan 2001-10-07. The government of Afghanistan offered to turn over Osama bin Laden, but they wanted evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the. Since the declassification of, it has been clear that if the US invaded anyone in retaliation for the, it should have been Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, the US invaded Afghanistan for other reasons. Shootings as a percent of all incidents during the First Intifada.The First Intifada began spontaneously after four Palestinians were killed and eight seriously injured after an Israeli military vehicle struck a car carrying Palestinian day laborers on December 7, 1987.

This led to 65,661 nonviolent protests and 140 shooting incidents in 1988 and 1989. Overreaction by Israeli troops and settlers over the first 18 months led to the deaths of roughly 650 Palestinians, totally out of proportion to the physical threat.Press coverage led to condemnation of this overreaction in Israel and around the world. A graph of the incarceration rate under state and federal jurisdiction per 100,000 population 1925–2008 (omits local jail inmates).

The male incarceration rate ( top line) is roughly 15 times the female rate ( bottom line).Evidence of this is seen in the five-fold increase in the between 1975 and 2000, after the incarceration rate had been relatively stable at roughly 0.1 percent for the previous half century; see Figure 9. The obvious driver of this was a shift in US politics that began around 1975 to 'get tough on crime.' This political change was driven by a shift in editorial policies of mainstream commercial broadcasting to focus on the police blotter. The broadcasters found they could reduce expenditures for investigative journalism, thereby reducing the risks of offending major advertisers, while still retaining (and perhaps increasing) their audience.The public got the impression that crime was out of control, even though no increase in crime was evident in the best available data. Politicians who wanted to 'get tough on crime' replaced those who resisted this trend.

The laws were changed, and the jumped dramatically, especially among people of color.Beyond this, what happens when police and prosecutors get convictions based on torture, coerced perjury, planted or falsified evidence or suppression of exculpatory evidence? Because stories from the police blotter are so cheap to produce, journalists and media outlets have a conflict of interest in honest reporting on any case involving official misconduct unless it becomes so big the media would lose audience for failing to report it.This provides an opportunity for corrupt police, prosecutors and judges, who believe they get promoted on convictions.

They get credit for fighting crime without actually impacting the crime rate, because the real perpetrators are still free.When fraudulent convictions are obtained disproportionately against. This in turn makes it more difficult to obtain the cooperation of the community, thereby making policing more difficult.